Podcar Conference a Bust

The Pod People have been hyping their silly conference for months. The Catherine Burke opinion piece in the LA Times was the opening shot in what I thought would be a barrage of publicity. I'm sure they also expected to see some national publicity come out about the conference.

In the last few days... (crickets).

The Connect Ithaca web site is still down.

There was some very silly local TV news reports on the conference:



A notable absence from the conference was would-be PRT vendor Taxi 2000/Skyweb Express... not even mentioned on the vendor page.

Olson still links to Skyweb Express on his campaign website.

Here's Olson and the Taxi 2000 pod back in the days when both were riding high in the media spotlight:

In the Dump Mark Olson Mailbox

Email received yesterday:

Dear Mr. Ken,

Your ad hominem arguments against rep Mark Olson are boring.  To continue to discredit PRT efforts because Mark was convicted of a misdemeanor is absurd.

In light of recent evidence of humans affecting climate change, new ways of "greener" public transport should be a universal human concern - don't you think?  Does it not make your stance a mute point?

I am his nephew, and while in no way do I condone his behavior towardshis family, or support all of his political views, it would be nice to see some factual content on your site that would prove PRT to be a
'boondoggle' as you so happily assert (and you can leave the sound effects out this time).

What is your solution for a public transportation system which is economically and environmentally viable?  If you can't provide some substance to the debate, you should probably shut down your website and do something else with your time.

sincerely,

Paul S. Olson

I have always said that I'd go to any public venue in Big Lake or anywhere else in the 6th District and explain exactly why PRT is infeasible and why Northstar, LRT and other real transit intiatives are a good thing.

Bigpedia PRT vs Wikipedia PRT

There's something called Bigpedia that uses a lot of the material from the Wikipedia PRT page... but also includes facts that PRT fanatics have kept out of the Wikipedia page including links to skeptical sites like mine and Light Rail Now's "Cyberspace" article.

Go to the Bigpedia PRT page and scroll down to "Disadvantages":

Disadvantages

Most planners say that no economically successful PRT system has been demonstrated, and there have been too many failures for a prudent person to spend public funds. Transit planners normally evaluate a new transport method as part of an intermodal network. In these cases, a PRT line may compete against a rail or bus line. When operated in an intermodal transit network, PRT may not fully realize the travel time reductions advanced by proponents, because connections to other mass-transit modes are only possible when the other vehicle arrives; a disadvantage where infrequent transit can be the weakest link in an intermodal system. Timed connections between conventional mass-transit modes, though rare, can be more efficient than PRT intermodal use.

The claims made by proponents depend on certain reasonable but nonstandard design features (see above). Many planners argue that if conservative ridership, operating expense ratios and inter-vehicle lead distances (for bus and train systems) are used, PRT systems are less attractive than bus and train systems.

In transit planning with standard ratios, if PRT were built in an existing high density corridor, it would be less efficient than trains. Only if additional capacity were required in a low density corridor, would it be more efficient than a bus line or automobile, since the capital costs of streets are already sunk.

Because of network effects, PRT is not fully useful until it is widespread. In this view, a small PRT system will not attract demand because it does not go to many destinations. Many people say that only a large PRT can attract sufficient demand to be self-sustaining. How it could grow from a niche to a local or metropolitan network is unclear to these persons. Growth to a national network is thought especially unlikely.

Skeptics say that PRT just idles entire vehicles, which is true. The effects of vehicular recycling at rush hours are also disputed by some transit planners, because they are simulations. Some skeptics have said that since gross capacities have to be comparable (because the same number of people are being transported in the same time), no advantage can occur. However, comparing capacity (people per hour), and capacity utilization (money per person per hour) is a fallacy.

Some experienced advocates claim that the chief problem is that PRT threatens existing livelihoods associated with cars, busses, trains and related services. Since the market in rapid transit has a limited (government) budget in each city, and existing options are the best-funded, existing options and organizations tend to win political battles. As of 2001, this may be changing, because existing options have been unable to solve traffic problems.

The claimed very high vehicle utilizations (vehicles are usually carrying passengers at full speed, rather than parked), means that there might be less need for, and investment in private vehicles, and auxiliary private services such as repair and insurance. Although these are social advantages, they directly threaten the livelihoods of many persons.

PRT systems may be as unattractive as other public transit. People cannot customize them to their tastes, and therefore rarely have anything approaching the enthusiasm shown for a new car. At Morgantown, most students use, but casually despise the transportation system, and recount stories of its failures. Some jokingly claim the term "PRT" is said to stand for "Pretty Retarded Train."

Some call PRT a prime example of a federally funded "pork barrel" project, one of many located in West Virginia due to the influence of Senator Robert Byrd.

A PRT system is said to have lower costs and automated operations. These could lead to simpler organizations and smaller staff at governmental transportation offices. This directly reduces the responsibility and authority of government officials, which in most civil service systems, reduces their pay. It does not offer much incentive to administrators to adopt it.

Many authorities say that the cost of constructing and operating the system is unlikely to be as low as claimed. Some systems (such as Morgantown) have had much higher costs than planned (Morgantown has to use steam heat to keep its tracks free of snow). Any new technology has to climb a learning curve, and for every new system, promoters must make speculative claims when asserting low construction and operating costs. Historically, costs are underestimated on transit projects and demand overestimated. Further, methods of recovering unplanned cost overruns can cause political and public strife.

The neighbors of such a system could oppose unsightly towers holding an elevated rail system, as well as the guideway itself. New infrastructure is hard to build, particularly without the support of the community.

How J. Edward Anderson Used PRT to Stop Rail Transit in the 1970's

The entire report in PDF form HERE.

The timeline summarizes how Anderson, with the help of his anti-transit buddies at the Citizens League and the University of Minnesota used PRT to confuse public officials about real transit choices:

1958- The Minnesota Highway Department initiated the area’s first metropolitan transportation planning effort, the Twin Cities Area Transportation Study.

1962- The Joint Program was established, consisting of the Metropolitan Planning Commission, the Minnesota Highway Department, and other planning and governmental bodies. It undertook a major transportation and land use study in the metropolitan area.

1967- In mid-1967, the Minnesota State Legislature established the Metropolitan Transit Commission. The Commission began in 1968 with a series of long-range planning studies. A few days later, the State legislature created a new regional governmental body, the Metropolitan Council. The Council set up a Transportation Planning Program to facilitate coordinated transportation planning.

1969- Upon completion of the long-range planning study done for the Transit Commission by Alan M. Voorhees, a joint Commission-Council staff report was prepared, setting forth the major components of a metropolitan transit planning program for 1970-71. The report recommended a “family of vehicles” concept that would use a variety of transportation modes, including fixed-guideway and bus service.

1970- Late in the year, the Metropolitan Council approved a Federal grant to the Transit Commission for preliminary engineering on a fixed-guideway system. The subsequent study proposed a fixed-guideway system utilizing a 40- passenger vehicle as the backbone of a regional system.

1971- The legislature further defined the role of the Transit Commission; it was to implement the development guide pre- pared by the Metropolitan Council.

1972- In the fall, the Metropolitan Council declined to review the Metropolitan Transit Commission’s transit plan on the grounds that the Council had exclusive authority to determine long- range transit plans. Meanwhile, the Council hired Barton Aschman, Inc., to study a bus approach to regional mass transit.

During the same period, further consideration of a personal rapid transit (PRT) system was advocated by University of Minnesota professor Edward Anderson.

1973- On November 15, the legislature’s Subcommittee on Mass Transit published a report called “The Metropolitan Mass Transit Need,” which favored elements of the Council’s bus proposal and the Commission’s fixed-guideway plan, as well as selective use of PRT.

1974- The legislature passed the Metropolitan Reorganization Act, directing the Transit Commission to complete by January 1, 1975, a plan for an automated small-vehicle fixed-guideway system within the metropolitan transit taxing district. The Council was to provide policy guidance.

Work began in August 1974 guided by a management committee composed equally of Commission and Council members. The consultant’s first report compared the Commission’s recommended 40-passenger vehicle
system with other alternatives.

The Commission and the Council drew conflicting findings from the study. The Commission recommended a fixed- guideway system other than a concentional[sic] rail transit, based on a n-seat vehicle. The Metropolitan Council opposed any fixed-guideway system and continued to support a regional bus system.

1975- No decision has been made on a long-range public transit plan. However, agreeement has been reached to concentrate on short-term improvements to the bus system.

PRT promoters did the same thing in Denver (PDF HERE) about the same time. In that case, a sales tax was levied to pay for the PRT:

Technically the issue before the voters at referendum was RTD’s request to levy the one-half cent sales tax. However, the tax was linked closely to a promotional campaign for the PRTs system. The RTD literature made direct reference to PRT, and a few weeks before the vote several firms displayed their PRT vehicles in Denver. In addition, the RTD board promised to consult the people again if the transit system finally selected was substantially different from PRT. The campaign strategy was successful, and on September 7, 1973, 57 percent of Denver region voters registered approval.

UMTA began backing away from its early enthusiasm for the Denver PRT proposal in 1974. Embarrassing cost overruns in the demonstration project in Morgantown, W. Va. had cast doubt on the financial and technical feasibility of a PRT system similar to the one proposed in Denver. In addition, the Airtrans System at the Dallas-FortWorth Airport—like Morgantown’s PRT, a technological predecessor of the proposed Denver system—was not performing up to specifications.

In the Twin Cities and Denver, PRT was so effective in the 1970's in blocking rail transit planning, J. Edward Anderson, Sheffer Lang, the anti-transit lobby, pro-highway legislators like Rep. Mark Olson and Michele Bachmann thought Anderson could do it again years later.



Ken Avidor blogs about the history of Personal Rapid Transit and other gadgetbahn scams.

Olson's Wife-Beating Trial is June 7th... Crank Up the PRT Publicity Machine!

When Rep. Mark Olson's PRT pal Gary Dean Zimmermann got into trouble before his election in 2005, the PRTistas were there to help out with press releases about PRT projects in Dubai and Heathrow.

My prediction then:

Of course ULTra runs on batteries and will likely end up on the trash-heap like the other PRT projects, but it will serve as a reliable engine of anti-transit propaganda for many years to come.

Now, on the eve of Olson's trial... just in case any reporter asks about Olson's PRT scam, we now have this article about the ULTra Heathrow project in the Sunday Times. It's a very silly article.

The electrically powered “pod cabs” will allow users to key in their destination and be carried there automatically along special roadways at speeds of up to 25mph.

... up to 25 mph doesn't qualify as "speed". The article insists that ULTra "is already being built and has completed trials." The article also says ULTra's Heathrow debut won't be until the end of 2008... then there's this weasel-worded statement:

The pods are seen as more economical, more environmentally friendly and less prone to being stuck in traffic than existing transport inside the airport.

..."environmentally friendly"? Says who?

Martin Lowson, founder and chief executive of Advanced Transport Systems, the Bristol-based manufacturer, said it would be far more convenient for users than conventional airport transport.

... Martin Lowson? Didn't he leave ATS? I guess ATS couldn't find a suitable crackpot or con-artist to replace Lowson.

We get some specs:

The pods will be guided by infrared sensors along 7ft-wide concrete roadways.

... picture that 7ft-wide concrete roadway in front of your home or business...

For the 2.6-mile-long terminal 5 section, they will be raised above existing roads, swooping down as they near their destinations.

... "swooping down"?...

In later phases the taxis will travel along ground-level routes separated from other traffic by 8ft walls.

... so if your battery-powered, glorified PRT golf cart breaks down, you'll either be up in the air or trapped between 8-ft walls.

Also, just in time for Olson's trial, the New Jersey PRT report (PDF HERE). It's filled with the same weasel-worded baloney you find in all the PRTista-generated literature. It's main argument is that after many decades of failure we should waste even more time and money on PRT research.

And there's a new You Tube video of the ugly, automated bus on concrete guideway called the Morgantown WVU PRT.

From the memory hole... here's a vintage video of Olson riding in J. Edward Anderson's toy PRT pod... enjoy:



Ken Avidor blogs about the Personal Rapid Transit.

Taxi 2000 Corporation Lawsuit Defendant's Weird List of Campaign Contributions

About a month ago, I received an anonymous tip that Taxi 2000 CEO Morrie Anderson was talking about suing former T2 CEO , founder and PRT guru J. Edward Anderson again. I dropped by the Hennepin County Government Center today and checked... nope, no new lawsuit... but....the documents from the old lawsuit are still there. It was interesting to re-read J. Edward Anderson's private e-mails to his co-defendants Chuck Michael of SEH and Ion Corporation President and CEO, Wendell Maddox.

I did a little Googling on Wendell Maddox and found his interesting list of campaign contributions:

Maddox, Wendell
Ion Electronics/President and CEO
MINNETONKA, MN
55345

08/14/2006--$1,100
GUTKNECHT FOR U.S. CONGRESS COMMITTEE - Republican

$2,000--08/09/2006
GUTKNECHT FOR U.S. CONGRESS COMMITTEE - Republican

08/06/2006--$1,000
ERLANDSON FOR U S REPRESENTATIVE - Democrat Farm Labor

06/30/2006--$1,000
ERLANDSON FOR U S REPRESENTATIVE - Democrat Farm Labor

06/07/2006--$400
KLINE FOR CONGRESS - Republican

03/31/2006--$300
BACHMANN FOR CONGRESS - Republican

12/19/2005--$1,000
KLINE FOR CONGRESS - Republican

12/07/2005--$4,600
REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA - Republican

09/28/2005--$500
KLINE FOR CONGRESS - Republican

09/23/2005--$1,000
MARK KENNEDY 06 - Republican

09/07/2005--$1,000
MARTIN OLAV SABO FOR CONGRESS VOLUNTEER COMMITTEE - Democrat Farm Labor

08/17/2005--$500
CANTOR FOR CONGRESS - Republican

08/08/2005--$1,000
GUTKNECHT FOR U.S. CONGRESS COMMITTEE - Republican

07/22/2005--$1,000
MARK KENNEDY 06 - Republican

02/16/2005--$500
KLINE FOR CONGRESS - Republican

Maddox also gave money to Teresa Daly who ran against Kline in 2004.